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Summary
Corporate longevity is – in essence – determined by a company’s intrinsic
competitive advantage (sometimes dubbed a “moat”) as well as exogenous factors: from
business doing ease – to broader, macroeconomic and strategic factors.
In this study, we have endeavoured to compare the business environments and
corporate sectors of two recent entrants into the European Union: Estonia and Poland.
Overall, Estonia, thanks to greater resolve in post-communist liberal transition, has
consistently ensured a superior corporate governance framework. Surprisingly, it is the
macroeconomic and strategic steadiness that led to higher corporate survival in Poland.
The global economic crisis of 2007–2009 is expected to further back this claim, as the
patterns of macroeconomic growth for both countries are set to widen.
introduction
“Corporate survival” and its wide-ranging ramifications for economic activity have
been the leitmotiv of numerous scientific pursuits. The phenomena have thus far been
examined in three major veins:
1. According to the first paradigm, or the so-called “ecological model”, it is
postulated that companies’ shifts amongst economic sectors tend to mimic
organic migrations amongst habitats. A distinctive feature of this approach is
attempting to track corporate changes across three major strata (akin to
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** Dr, adiunkt, Szkoła Gł￳wna Handlowa w Warszawie.2. The second perspective of corporate survival assumes that the market entry act
is a make-or-break event in the life of an enterprise: only at that point is the
entity able to prove its mettle (it either weathers this critical stage or continues
to prosper, or goes out of business).Thus, the key drivers of this “survival of the
fittest” are examined at market level (i.e. beyond the enterprise). It thereby
assumed that structural characteristics, such as barriers to entry or exit, diffusion
of high technologies substantially affect the longevity and growth patterns of
start-ups.
3. The third train of thought focuses on the human capital/entrepreneurial aspect.
Under this model, a great deal of significance is attached to the entrepreneur and
his/her personal traits, such as expertise, education, appetite for risk. For
example, Preisendorfer and Voss (1990) argue that the chances of corporate
survival are directly correlated with the entrepreneur’s personality.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned approaches, Poznańska (2008) and other
scholars consistently stress the role played by institutional infrastructure in the direction
and shape of corporate life cycles.
The following study examines the corporate survival concept in two European
economies which joined the European Union in the past decade – Estonia and Poland.
1. Ease of doing business – World Bank Group rankings
The “Doing Business” database marketed in the media under the aggregate emblem
of “Ease of Doing Business” and published annually by theWorld Bank Group represents
the most cogent and comprehensive approach to measuring “business friendliness” in
worldwide economies. The index (Doing Business, 2009) ranks economies from 1 (best)
to 181 (worst) and is calculated as a simple average of percentile rankings across its 10
components – more methodology details are available from the relevant web site: Doing
Business Ranking Methodology (2009):
The usefulness of the “Doing Business” index in predicting corporate longevity
seems fairly instinctive: business survival ought to be a function of economic
circumstances in which enterprises operate.
In the most recent index edition, Doing Business (2009), Estonia and Poland have
displayed contrasting degrees of comfort in undertaking and maintaining business activity.
Overall, Estonia (22) – in a peer group with Switzerland and Korea – markedly outran
Poland (76): flanked by the Czech Republic and Pakistan.
Besides the overall distance between both economies in the ranking, it is its makeup
that betrays veritable differences in the functionality of both economic systems. The
general findings can be encapsulated in the following ways:
• Estonia – compared with Poland – clearly offers a more developed business
culture on the vast majority of counts; the single discernible constraint relates to
hiring workers (a legacy of Estonia’s tight regulations protecting the domestic
labour market from immigration, including lasting problems with the ethnic
Russian minority);
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bureaucracy: any activity involving administrative assent or inference (be it
business starts or closes, construction permits, property registrations or tax return
filings) results in vexatious delays;
• Estonia is continuing to benefit from a sustained record of liberal transition:
including a fiscal revolution (a flat tax introduced back in 1994), widespread
access to the Internet (enshrined under several laws, which facilitates access to
government agencies and minimises relevant red tape). Contrarily, Poland –
despite a gallant leap towards laisser-faire capitalism in the early 1990s, has
regressed to economic over-protectionism as the new millennium drew near.
The “Ease of Doing Business” sub-rankings have been examined in greater detail
in the following paragraphs of this paper.
1.1. Starting a business (formalities, time, cost and capital needed) in Estonia
and Poland in 2005–2009
Unsurprisingly, the very idea of business survival hinges on incorporation
(otherwise referred to as corporate association). Ultimately, to be able to measure the
longevity of a body corporate, one has to extrapolate from the very premise of its prior
establishment.
Founding a new business, Djankov et al. (2002), has required by far more effort in
Poland than in Estonia in the period for which statistics are available. Suffice it to say that
over the past five years no headway has been made in Poland in the number of formalities
necessary to set up a business, and they are twice more numerous than those in Estonia
as at 2009.
On average, it has taken a flat month to incorporate a business concept in Poland
throughout 2005–2009 (no palpable reform in this category during this period). In
discernible contrast, during the past half-decade, Estonia has curtailed the time lag
between the conceptual and operational phases from some 72 days down to a mere week.
This has mirrored a mental about-turn amongst local bureaucracy as well as sustained
progress in technical sophistication (increasing reliance on Internet connectivity in
business start-up proceedings).
Another critical factor relating to business inception is the cost side. The (Doing
Business 2009) index measuring the cost of starting up a business (as a percentage of the
country’s per-capita income) has favoured Estonia over Poland. Evidently, an entrepreneur
need think twice before embracing a business concept in Poland, as about one-fifth of the
expected proceeds are likely to wind up covering incorporation fees. This represents a
significant drag on entrepreneurship, which – by definition – implicates significant risk
exposure. Estonia, contrariwise, has managed to cut this (risk related) factor to a
diminutive 1.7.
An additional barrier to business growth is represented by minimal capital
mandated by regulators in a given jurisdiction. Theoretically, shareholders’funds afford
a measure of security to anyone willing to contract with a business entity (albeit in an era
of global capital flows and creative accounting, practical reliability of this safeguard can
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ties up seed/start-up capital, which (usually) comes at a high opportunity cost and might
(otherwise) be allocated in a smoother and more economically attuned fashion.
The Polish jurisprudence has made considerable strides to lighten the burden of
business incorporation; however, it still remains exorbitant by Estonian standards. In
Estonia (as at 2009), the capital requirement tends to consume a little under a fifth of a
citizen’s income. In present-day Poland, it devours almost 170% of personal earnings.
As aforementioned, additional comfort derived by a company’s stakeholders (from the
thus enhanced capital r￩gime) cannot be taken for granted in the practical circumstances
of business liquidation, an issue examined later on in this paper.
1.2. Dealing with construction permits (formalities, time and cost) in Estonia
and Poland in 2006–2009
Property development is essential for companies whose facilities rely, at least
somewhat, on traditional infrastructure (i.e. the vast majority of enterprises in emerging
economies). The number of formalities needed to obtain a construction permit serves as
the inverse of flexibility with which enterprises are allowed to expand via recourse to
traditional (physical) assets. Formal impediments to such expansion exist in both
economies, yet Poland appears to be by far more bureaucratic in this respect (twice the
number of procedures needed). Neither country has succeeded in deregulating the
construction sector during the period covered by Doing Business reports (2006–2009).
The waiting period needed to initiate construction of a property hinders business
growth for self-evident reasons: business concepts, inevitably, slip into (near) hibernation
while permission is being eagerly awaited. Considerable stamina and patience are de
rigueur for an applicant awaiting a construction permit in Estonia or Poland. Endurance
is measured in months (over three in Estonia) and close to a calendar year (in Poland).
Needless to observe, volatile economic circumstances can render a business endeavour
completely futile in such a time span (a hazard absorbed by the entrepreneur and,
obviously, scantly recognised by either officialdoms). No progress in this scope has been
noted in the past four years in Estonia or Poland.
The cost of securing a construction permit adds to an already lengthy catalogue of
economic constraints to business expansion. In line with the aforementioned yardsticks
of formalism, Estonia has remarkably undercut Poland in terms of permit costs as a
percentage of per-capita income in 2006–2009. Poland has noted discernible progress
during the surveyed period; nevertheless, construction permit expenses have tended to
outweigh per-capita incomes.
1.3. Employing workers in Estonia and Poland (hiring difficulty, work schedule
flexibility and firing difficulty) in 2004–2009
Employment conditions are regarded as a preeminent consideration in undertaking
and maintaining business activity. Entrepreneurs tend to favour circumstances enabling
hassle-free adjustment to macroeconomic/industrial demand/supply cyclicality; rigorous
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is, pursuant to the relevant methodology – Botero et al. (2004) – composed of three
subcategories, which have been examined hereunder.
The difficulty of hiring index (taking into account availability and duration of fixed-
term contractual agreements as well as ratios of minimum to average wages) offers a
proxy for the flexibility of a given labour market. Interestingly, Estonia – despite certain
progress – has clearly lagged Poland in this category. This attests to the relative rigidity
of the Estonian job market (with more flexible terms being available to employers in
Poland: including, but not limited to, renewable short-term contracts).
The rigidity of hours index (availability of night shifts, workweek length, overtime
extensions, shortness of paid annual vacation) demonstrates to what extent employers
can fall back on the existing workforce to enhance short-term productivity, while keeping
costs in check (e.g. in response to international or cyclical factors). There has been no
change to working schedule arrangements in either country during the past five years.
Furthermore, working habits in Estonia (index value: 80) tend to be more formalised than
those in Poland (index value: 60), which confirms notions perceptible in the aforesaid
hiring trends.
When the business climate sours, entrepreneurs may wish to downsize operations
to retain financial liquidity. The difficulty of firing index (Doing Business, 2009) aims to
gauge redundancy ease (its legality, contractual aspects, mass layoff protections as well
as worker re-assignment/re-training constraints). By this standard, Estonian employers
are confronted with higher barriers to headcount optimisation (index value at 60) than
those faced by their Polish counterparts (index value at 40). Similarly to other employment
related indices, neither country has managed to improve competitiveness in this critical
area during the analysed period (2004–2009).
The firing costs indicator (Doing Business, 2009) demonstrates how laws relating
to advance termination notice and severance pay/termination boost costs of regular
salaries (measurable in weeks). The picture painted by firing dues in both countries for
2004–2009 corroborates the perception that Poland (40 weeks) has developed a more
flexible employment market than Estonia (60 weeks). No betterment has taken place in
either economy over the past half-decade.
1.4. Registering property in Estonia and Poland (number of procedures, time
and cost) in 2004–2009
Registering property matters to entrepreneurs who, for a variety of reasons, need
secure legal title to land and fixtures built upon it (a usual occurrence for businesses active
in traditional industries). There has been no deregulation to property registration
formalities in Estonia or Poland in 2005–2009, according to Doing Business (2009).
Interaction with local bureaucracy has, statistically, been twice as arduous in Poland (6
encounters needed) as it is in Estonia (3 contacts necessary).
The time required to affect a formal transfer of legal title to a piece of property has
been estimated at 51 days in Estonia and at a staggering 197 days in Poland throughout
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either economy in this regard.
Costs attributable to property registration play a major role in overall business
models. Fortunately, their scale in Estonia and Poland is miniscule, what is more –
dramatic improvement took place in both countries over the past three years (2007–2009).
This idyllic perspective is somewhat marred by more practical references (the continued
bull market for property in the new European Union countries per se slashed the
proportion of registration fees in soaring property valuations).
1.5. Getting credit (strength of legal rights, credit information depth and credit
bureau coverage)
The database (Doing Business, 2009) contains rankings of credit environments
existing in individual economies under survey. Effective access to debt financing
represents a fundamental characteristic of an economic system and considerable leverage
for corporate growth, especially in emerging countries, where the financing gap is
especially hard to bridge. Recent empirical findings relating to challenges arising from the
funding of young companies in the circumstances of an emerging economy (viewed from
the perspective of a LatinAmerican fund), can be perused in deAngulo and Lopez (2005).
The strength of legal rights index: Doing Business (2009), a subdivision of the
“getting credit” category, Djankov et al. (2007) helps to pass judgment on the availability
of legal recourse in collateral and bankruptcy proceedings. Accordingly, its objective is
to assess the extent of coverage and flexibility with regard to various asset classes
(including working capital) being put up for collateral; collateral registry practices and
well as the “pecking order” or creditors (who are usually prioritised in the event a
bankruptcy); a general reflection on the tempo of bankruptcy proceedings and availability
of out-of-court settlement mechanisms.
Basing on the (Doing Business, 2009) “legal rights index”, Poland (rated 8) has
ensured a more secure credit environment than Estonia (ranked 6) throughout the analysed
period. Nevertheless, these scores ought to be interpreted with considerable caution.
Neither jurisdiction offers a high level of practical protection in the event of litigation (a
prerequisite for successful bankruptcy proceedings): an issue re-examined in this paper.
The Credit Information Index (Doing Business 2009) has been designed to measure
the “depth” (detail) and “breadth” (scope) of corporate credit information available from
public or private sources in a given economy. In line with the index scores for Estonia (5)
and Poland (4), unchanged for the past five years, the Estonian economy has consistently
offered a slightly higher quality of credit transparency, a major factor from the credit “due
diligence” standpoint.
A equally important benchmark of credit transparency relates to the
comprehensiveness of public/private registry coverage (as a percentage of the adult
population) in respect of data on repayment history, unpaid debts or credit outstanding for
the preceding five years: Doing Business (2009). No unified public registry of this sort
has been noted in either economy, whereas the Polish private registry system has
conspicuously outperformed its Estonian equivalent in 2005–2009. This has mirrored a
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information on “bad debt (-ors)”.
1.6. Investor protection strength (disclosure, director liability, shareholder
lawsuits) in Estonia and Poland in 2006–2009
Investor protection standards matter increasingly more in an era of globalisation,
capital flight and conflicting interests among (often diverse) shareholder groups. The
Doing Business (2009) database offers a proxy for how effectively countries tend to
protect minority investors in the hypothetical event of an “unfair” (albeit not necessarily
fraudulent) transaction concluded with the majority shareholder, Djankov et al. (2008a).
According to the assumed scenario, the dispute has to be resolved through the corporate
governance and legal system. It how it will be processed by this system that matters most
to the investor universe.
The Extent of Disclosure Index (Doing Business 2009) provides insight into
disclosure practices in such a situation (shareholding voting, mandatory public disclosure,
inclusion in a corporate annual report, mandatory disclosure to the board of directors and
to an external auditor). The index ranges from 0 (worst) to 10 (best). In 2006–2009,
Estonia posted a static 8, while Poland a constant 7 on such a scale.
Liability of company directors, as per the Director Liability Index (Doing Business
2009), comprises the following factors: directors’and chief executive officers’suability
for damages, possibility of rescission by court (in case of proven fraud or bad faith) with
regard to a corporate action, effectives of damages payment and repayment of unfair
profits, criminal penalties as well as availability of direct and derivative litigation.
The extent of director liability in Estonia (3) and Poland (2) must be viewed as
rather unsatisfactory (on a scale from 0 to 10). This mirrors the negligible personal
responsibility borne, in practical circumstances, by company officers for corporate actions
performed on behalf of companies. No betterment whatsoever has been recorded in either
country in the period of 2006–2009.
The Shareholder Suits Index, as explained under the (Doing Business 2009)
methodology, measures various aspects of litigation effectiveness: scope of documentation
available to the shareholder claimant (otherwise referred to as “plaintiff”), the claimant’s
ability to question the defendant or witnesses during trial, to request a government probe
into the case without litigating, the shareholder’s right of inspecting documentation prior
to filing suit and a lesser burden of proof/persuasion for a civil lawsuit than for a criminal
case – to which the assumption of innocence (“indulged in the absence of contrary
evidence”) applies, cf. Hamer (2007). On the index scale from 0 to 10, Estonia has scored
a constant 5.7 in 2006–2009. Poland improved minimally (from 5.7 to 6.0 in 2007) and
has remained unaltered through 2009.
1.7. Paying taxes (number of taxes, tax settlement time, total tax rate)
Taxes play a vital role in a business environment. This recognition has – over the
past decade – led a number of governments around the world to use it as a competitive
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economic zones (with low tax regimes) and growing simplification of tax systems, e.g.
via introduction of flat taxes; recent experience related to flat tax reform in Russia can be
retrieved from Gorodnichenko et al. (2008).
Under the Doing Business methodology, Djankov et al. (2009), a typical company
has been chosen to exemplify prevalent business conditions in a country.
The Tax Payments Indicator is aimed a quantifying the total number of taxes and
fiscal contributions payable in a given fiscal jurisdiction. Unsurprisingly, the ease of doing
business exhibits negative correlation with the quantity of taxes and quasi-taxes that have
to be addressed in a given economy.
In this regard, Estonia (10 tax payments throughout 2006–2009) appears to be
significantly more liberal than Poland (40 tax payments in 2006, 2007 and 2009 and 41
in 2008). Businesses filing their taxes in Poland usually perceive the fiscal system as
relatively complicated and oftentimes necessitating the assistance of professional advisors,
which adds to the risk and cost of doing business.
The comparison reflects a flat tax introduced in Estonia back in 1994, alongside a
series of deregulatory measures implemented by this country over the past two decades
(including the abandonment of certain taxes). Poland has managed to achieve some
progress in reforming corporate taxes, yet the overall (largely progressive and opaque)
system remains rather incongruous and internationally uncompetitive.
The time needed to comply with the domestic fiscal system (i.e. prepare, file and
pay fiscal dues) further epitomises differences in business friendliness between both
regimes. In 2006–2009, it has taken an average of 81 hours (slightly over three days) for
an Estonian to square up with the taxman, as opposed to some 418 hours (almost two and
a half weeks) in Poland. To a business entity, the very act of tax preparation represents
negative value: not only does a company have to share part of its profits with the
government (the very nature of taxation), but it is oftentimes de facto coerced into
retaining the services of external advisers (costly) to cut through the fiscal red tape.
According to Doing Business (2009), the Total Tax Rate Ratio scales the amount
of taxes and mandatory contributions (quasi-taxes) payable by the business in the second
year of operation, expressed as a share of commercial profits. Pursuant to this
methodology, fiscal burdens fall into the following five categories: profit or corporate
income tax, social contributions and labour taxes paid by the employer (for which all
mandatory contributions are included, even if paid to a private entity such as a requited
pension fund), property taxes, turnover taxes and other small taxes (such as municipal
fees and vehicle and fuel taxes). The Doing Business Methodology (2009) defines
commercial profits as sales minus cost of goods sold, minus gross salaries, minus
administrative expenses, minus other expenses, minus provisions, plus capital gains (from
the property sale) minus interest expense, plus interest income and minus commercial
depreciation.
Surprisingly, Estonia has relatively overburdened its businesses with fiscal levies
(in relation to profits), if compared with Poland. In 2006–2009, the aforementioned total
tax rate has consumed about 50.0% of corporate earnings in Estonia, whereas about 40.0%
in Poland. In interpreting the results, caveats need, nonetheless, be sounded. Firstly, both
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statistical, let alone fiscal accountability (i.e. classified as the so-called “grey” or
“informal” economy).Arguably, the “informal economy” concept, coined by Hart (1973),
is likely to be deeper ingrained in Poland than in Estonia (vide – earlier comments on
socio-economic, historical and political factors and later remarks on business
transparency). Secondly, a fair amount of latitude exists in recognising profits, costs and
depreciation under both fiscal/accounting systems, wherein the very definitions of many
accounting and taxation terms do not entirely overlap (despite ongoing convergence with
International Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS); more on the character of “creative
accounting” practices in Mulford and Comiskey (2002). Thirdly, for small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) divisions between “corporate” and “personal” income (and resultant
taxation) frequently tend to blur.
1.8. Trading across borders (documents, time and cost involved in importing
and exporting) in Estonia and Poland in 2006–2009
Foreign exchange of products and services continues its long-term expansion, as
worldwide economies become more and more interdependent (globalisation).The Doing
Business database contains a measure of “trading across borders”, i.e. openness to
international commerce, Djankov et al. (2008b). It is noteworthy that both countries
(Estonia and Poland) joined the European Union (EU) in 2004, they have also been
members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since 1999 (Estonia) and 1995
(Poland). The conditions enabling membership of the EU are available from the
respective organisational web sites: European Union On-Line (2009) and WTO (2009).
The Doing Business (2009) Export/Import Documents Indices endeavour to
quantify the number of documents required to export or import a standardised cargo of
goods by ocean transport. In this comparison, Estonia (with 3 documents needed in
exports and 4 in imports) has seemed less bureaucratic than Poland (5 documents both for
exports and imports) in all 2006–2009.
The time necessary to comply with export/import formalities is regarded as another
proxy for constraints in foreign trade activity. Intriguing insights can be gained by
comparing how laborious exportation and importation is, on average, in both countries.
Estonia (with 5 days for exports and 4 for imports) seems deregulated if compared with
Poland (some 17 days for exports and 5 for imports) for 2006–2009. Oddly for an
emerging economy (whose past growth has been driven, to a large extent, by brisk
exportation), Poland seems by far stricter in monitoring outbound (than inbound) trade
flows – at least judging by the compliance efforts involved.
Finally, costs attributable to exportation and importation figure prominently in the
business models of entities active in foreign trade. In conformity with the Doing Business
(2009) methodology, their scale has been expressed by the fees levied on a 20-foot
container in USD.
Such costs differ considerably between Estonia and Poland basing on Doing
Business (2009) estimates. In Estonia, it has taken USD 675 in costs to import and export
a standardised container in 2006–2008. In 2009, the estimated costs have risen to USD
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costs have amounted to a flat USD 834 in 2006–2009.
1.9. Enforcing contracts (judicial efficiency measured by the number
of procedures, time and cost) in Estonia and Poland in 2005–2009
The readiness of legal remedies helps to illustrate a judiciary’s efficiency in
resolving a commercial dispute, an essential prerequisite to capital formation in a
developing economic environment. Under the Doing Business methodology, Djankov et
al. (2003), the dispute concerns a lawful transaction (between a buyer and a seller) whose
value is tied to a country’s twofold per-capita income. The hypothetical dispute (over the
quality of goods having been sold) is assumed to be resolved in the seller’s favour; no
appeal is lodged and the judicial judgment becomes final. The indices measure the pace
of evolution of such a dispute before local courts.
The number of procedures mandatory to see a commercial claim through a local
court system has been similar in both countries. In Estonia, it has been 37 in 2005–2007
and 36 in 2008–2009. For Poland, this measure of bureaucracy has stood at 38 throughout
2005–2009 (no progress noted).
Time, a key factor in redressing a claim, is of the essence to a business whose
proceeds (and sometimes the very fact of further existence) depend on a speedy outcome
of litigation. The patience of a Polish businessperson awaiting an effective legal remedy
has to be exercised over a span of some two years and three months. Needless to add,
many corporate entities will have gone permanently out of business by that time. In
Estonia, this range, albeit prolonged, has been limited to one year and two months.To top
it all off, judicial efficacy indices used by Doing Business (2009) assume finality of first
instance rulings, whereas in actuality many of them end up being (re)appealed and
reversed.
Cost efficiency, which – in conformity with the Doing Business (2009) database –
is calculated as a percentage of the claim in question and is assumed to be equivalent to
200% of income per capita, highlights another aspect of contract enforcement. Obviously,
entrepreneurs favour regimes with moderate legal expenses required to enforce a claim.
In this respect, Estonia (18.9%) has offered a more burdensome judicial
environment than Poland (12.0%) in 2005–2009. Evidently, the tardy Polish judiciary has
operated more cost efficiently, although it is disputable whether this counterbalances the
time disparity between both legal systems.
1.10. Closing a business (the time, cost and outcome of bankruptcy proceedings
involving domestic entities) in Estonia and Poland in 2004–2009
Bankruptcy efficiency comes as a last criterion for comparing the economic
environments of both countries, as per Doing Business, Djankov et al. (2008c).
In order to ensure data comparability, assumptions about the business and the case
have been made. Besides country size adjustments, the business is assumed to be a hotel
operation whose core asset is downtown property secured by a mortgage. Owing to
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Too many creditors preclude the owners from seeking an out-of-court settlement. The
course of action is thus limited to is a judicially supervised rehabilitation/reorganisation,
a liquidation or a foreclosure.
The time needed to complete such a course of action has been measured in calendar
years under Doing Business (2009). In Estonia and Poland, it has taken a flat three years
to complete bankruptcy proceedings in 2004–2009 (no improvement discerned during
that time).Again, such a period, if contrasted with macro- and micro-economic cyclicality,
seems rather elongated. Suffice it to say that many creditors will have gone out of business
by the time their recovered debt finally starts percolating.
The cost of bankruptcy proceedings (calculated as a percentage of the bankruptcy
estate, based on survey responses by bankruptcy practitioners) gives an idea about the
efficiency of debt recovery according to Doing Business (2009). During the period for
which coverage is available, Estonia has proved to be visibly more productive in
bankruptcy formalities (9%) as opposed to Poland (22% for 2004–2008 and 20% for
2009).
Finally, recovery rates (expressed as s cents on the dollar recouped by creditors
through the bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings) tend to differ in both countries. Basing
on Doing Business (2009) data, Estonia has turned out to be slightly more successful id
debt recovery than Poland.
2. Composition of economic entities in Estonia and Poland in 2001–2008
As clearly demonstrated in Tables 1 and 2, the corporate sector in both countries
has been dominated by small firms (0-9 employees), a concentration particularly evident
for Poland: some 95% of all economic entities in 2001–2008.
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Table 1. Structure of Polish economic entities by workforce in 2001–2008
Source: (Polish) Central Statistical Office on-line reports (available at: http://www.stat.gov.pl/)
Headcount 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0–9 95,2% 95,2% 95,2% 95,1% 95,1% 95,0% 95,0% 94,9%
10–49 3,8% 3,8% 3,9% 4,0% 4,0% 4,1% 4,1% 4,1%
50–249 0,9% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8%
Over 250 0,2% 0,2% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,2%
Source: Statistics Estonia (available at: http://www.stat.ee/)
Headcount 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0–9 86,0% 86,5% 86,0% 87,3% 87,8% 88,2% 88,5% 88,8%
10–49 11,6% 11,2% 11,5% 10,4% 10,0% 9,7% 9,4% 9,2%
50–249 2,2% 2,0% 2,2% 2,1% 2,0% 1,9% 1,8% 1,8%
Over 250 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,2% 0,3%
Table 2. Structure of Estonian economic entities by workforce in 2001–2008As in Poland, the share of Estonian enterprises employing over 50 staff has been
negligible in 2001–2006 (about 2%). Undoubtedly, small businesses have stood behind
the bulk of entrepreneurial activity in Estonia, with sustained progress, roughly, Polish
proportions (Table 2).
The breakdown by corporate activity has also displayed numerous similarities for
both countries in 2001–2008 (Table 3). Distributive trades have represented the most vital
segmentofbotheconomies:adiscernibleabout-turnfromthesmoke-stackbusinesscultures
of the 1980s. Real estate (et al.) has also accounted for a substantial share of Estonian and
Polish corporate life, followed by manufacturing and construction. In the analysed period,
both countries saw massive investment inflows into their property markets.
3. The business survival phenomenon in Estonia and Poland in 2001–2009
Statistical coverage of corporate insolvency events in Estonia and Poland remains
patchy and ought to be interpreted with caution due to the following limitations:
• Insolvency practices are subject to considerable legal rigour; their frameworks
vary between both jurisdictions: the Polish Bankruptcy and Restructuring Law
(2003) and the Estonian BankruptcyAct (2003), yet the underlying notion relates
to a company’s inability to service its debt, as it falls due. Comparative studies
on both insolvency jurisprudences have recently been compiled in Global Legal
Group (2009).
• By virtue of the legal character of insolvency/bankruptcy proceedings,
substantial time lags occur between initial evidence of payment woes and the
ultimate insolvency declaration. This dilutes potential correlations between
insolvency and other economic variables.
• Inconsistent and limited time periods for which data sets are available lengthen
the odds of an interpreter of economic phenomena linked to insolvency in
Estonia and Poland over the recent decade. It is worth emphasising that the scant
data render any in-depth statistical or mathematical modelling futile.
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Table 3. Corporate structure by activity in Estonia and Poland in 2005
Source: Eurostat (2009), available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
Industry Estonia Poland
Mining & quarrying 0.0% 0.1%
Construction 9.8% 11.4%
Hotels & restaurants 4.0% 4.1%
Distributive trades 35.2% 42.1%
Real estate, renting & business activities 28.4% 19.0%
Manufacturing 13.4% 13.5%
Transport & communications 8.5% 9.7%
Electricity, gas & water supply 0.7% 0.1%• Finally, as Coface (2009) and Creditreform (2009) expressly avow, data covering
insolvencies and bankruptcies in emerging European economies are not always
sufficiently representative and adequately reliable.
Duly mindful of such constraints, it is nevertheless striking to see a dramatic (since
2003: exponential)improvement in business survival in Poland, against a creeping upward
trend in insolvencies in Estonia in 2001–2008.
Eurostat (2009), Statistics Estonia (2009) and the Polish Central Statistical Office
(2009) provide intriguing insights into the structural features of corporate longevity in
both economies. Regrettably, reasonably comparable data for both countries are scant and
their series do not match perfectly. Nevertheless, tentative observations can be made
thereupon.
As indicated by Table 4, corporate survival in Poland tended to peak for
entrepreneurs aged 30–39. Conversely, a larger risk of bankruptcy was run by enterprises
led by young individuals (below 30 years of age).At this point, it would not be far-fetched
to reiterate that experience matters to successful entrepreneurship, and that the generation
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Figure 1. Insolvency declarations in Estonia and Poland in 2001–2008
Source: Coface (2009), Creditreform (2009), Eurostat (2009), CIAWorld Factbook (2009); economic/civil
court data. Note: Estonian 1Q2008 civil court estimates have been annualised for all 2008; no data
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40+ 41,4of Polish 30-39-year-olds is, on the one hand, seasoned enough to have witnessed the
swift phase-out of communism (commenced there in 1989), subsequent heyday of
economic restructuring of the 1990s, as well as the dot.com boom-and-bust of 1998–2001
– whilst, on the other, is sufficiently progressive to have forgotten about the ancien r￩gime.
The Estonian road to free-market democracy began somewhat later than in Poland,
i.e. in 1992 (upon the declaration of independence); this time lag is mirrored in corporate
continuation statistics – in Estonia tilted towards younger entrepreneurs (Table 5).
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Table 5. Enterprises established in Estonia in 2002 and continued till 2005: proportion in main activity (by
entrepreneur’s age, in %)
Source: Key figures on European business with a special feature on the factors of business success – Eurostat (2008). Note:
theaverageisbasedondatacovering:Bulgaria,theCzechRepublic,Denmark,Italy,Lithuania,Luxemburg,Austria,Romania,
Slovakia and Sweden.
Age Industry Construction Distributive trades Other Service
Average
< 30 12.3 17.0 32.2 38.5
30–39 11.0 16.9 31.4 40.7
40+ 12.2 13.6 30.9 43.3
Estonia
< 30 7.2 6.8 40.7 45.3
30–39 11.0 7.3 40.5 41.2
40+ 15.6 9.9 33.4 41.0
In Estonia, apart from the (highly peculiar) extractive sector, corporate survival
tended to concentrate around the “health & social work” as well as “other community,
social and personal service activities”, i.e. typical “defensive”, or “low β” sectors
(exhibiting limited correlation with general macro-economic cyclicality).The reverse was
true for the financial sector (high gearing), wholesaling, retailing and automotive repair
(susceptible to the ebb and flow of supply/demand factors), cf. Table 6.
In general terms, Polish enterprises underperformed their Estonian peers at the
comparable point in time. In Poland, only 28.2% of businesses set up in 2001 continued
their activity till 2006. In addition, incorporated entities appeared to fare better than sole
proprietorships – a probable function of formal capital requirements.
By activity, the worst performers turned out to be hotels and restaurants and
contractors of which, respectively, 20.4% and 23.0% survived a five year period.
Statistically, the safest bets appeared to be placed on industrial operations and construction
services (a classical “grey” sector eluding proper coverage in official statistics due to
fiscal evasion), cf. Table 7.
Furthermore, numerous research studies have endeavoured to establish causal
relationships between key macroeconomic variables (including Gross Domestic Product
dynamics) and “corporate demography” in emerging economies, e.g.. Auzina and Pocs
(2008).An allusion to the macroeconomic dimension of corporate longevity has also been
propounded in the conclusions.conclusions
The following tentative conclusions can be drawn in respect of economic
environments and business survival trends in Estonia and Poland over the past decade:
• Estonian superiority over Poland in the vast majority of critical factors
epitomising the quality of institutions and economic environment; the few
nr1/2010(13) Wsp￳łczesna ekonomia
111
Table 6. Five-year survival rates of enterprises established in 2000 in Estonia (by economic activity)
Source: Statistics Estonia (2009), available on-line at: http://www.stat.ee/
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Economic activities total 76.2% 62.7% 55.2% 49.9% 45.4%
Mining 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Manufacturing 76.6% 66.7% 58.4% 54.1% 49.4%
Electricity, gas and water supply 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 60.0%
Construction 87.3% 79.3% 68.0% 64.7% 59.3%
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles etc. 73.6% 58.6% 50.7% 44.7% 40.4%
Hotels and restaurants 73.6% 63.6% 57.9% 49.6% 45.5%
Transport, storage and communication 83.9% 70.0% 63.2% 57.4% 52.0%
Financial intermediation 70.5% 47.7% 38.6% 38.6% 36.4%
Real estate, renting and business activities 75.1% 61.9% 55.1% 50.4% 45.4%
Education 85.7% 67.9% 57.1% 53.6% 50.0%
Health and social work 95.7% 85.1% 83.0% 83.0% 83.0%





Item 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total 64,5% 49,2% 39,2% 31,9% 28,2%
Legal form
Private individuals 64,4% 48,7% 38,4% 31,1% 27,2%
Companies 66,5% 59,4% 56,4% 51,7% 49,0%
Principal activity
Industry 64,1% 58,9% 52,3% 43,2% 39,9%
Construction 63,3% 44,9% 32,2% 22,6% 23,0%
Trade 64,4% 48,1% 36,9% 31,9% 26,7%
Hotels and restaurants 56,9% 32,0% 28,5% 23,0% 20,4%
Transport 76,1% 60,3% 39,7% 30,5% 27,1%
Construction services 62,4% 48,1% 43,4% 34,2% 30,3%exceptions comprise: hiring difficulty, private credit bureau coverage, total fiscal
levies (as part of commercial profits), scale of government and financial sector
sophistication.
• The dramatic fall in insolvencies in Poland since 2003, especially if compared
to a slow (but discernible) rise in Estonia during the same period, cannot be
justified by sheer reasons of systemic (un)friendliness. Overall, Estonia has
offered significantly more propitious conditions for entrepreneurship than Poland
during the surveyed period.
• Underperformance of Polish enterprises v. Estonian peers in business continuity.
Although the Polish progress in cutting corporate insolvencies has been
remarkable, Estonian enterprises demonstrated superior business robustness.
This peculiarity can be explained by the earlier timing of the business continuity
data, as well as non-insolvency impacts (e.g. corporate restructuring, inter-
sectoral migrations, voluntary dissolutions) that resulted in other-than-insolvency
business closes.
• Macroeconomic furnishes additional clues as to the survival phenomenon.
Although over the past decade, Estonia has outstripped Poland in per-capita
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) expansion, Estonian GDPhas followed a highly
volatile pattern, in contrast to a slower, yet more predictable GDP growth in
Poland. Such elevated macro-economic volatility must have corresponded to
higher micro-economic risks (increased variance in corporate cash flows, e.g.
measurable by ʲ). More on the conceptual foundations of corporate risk
measurement (in micro- and macroeconomic settings) can be retrieved from
Damodaran (2009).
• Bureaucratic inertia in recognising and enforcing insolvency/bankruptcy events
could have worked to the “advantage” of Poland – at least on paper. In
simplification, the less efficient a judiciary happens to be in processing
insolvency/bankruptcy claims, the more optimistic picture it paints in the
short/medium term.
• “Informal economy” scale could (partially) explain the absence of
insolvency/bankruptcy events in the official statistics. As stated at the outset,
Poland, being a more opaque economy, has a larger proportion of enterprises
active in the economic “twilight zone” and under-represented in official
statistical reporting.
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Przetrwanie przedsiębiorstwa w określonym otoczeniu gospodarczym jest w spo-
s￳b zasadniczy zdeterminowane jego wewnętrzną konkurencyjnością, a także czynnika-
mi zewnętrznymi: od łatwości prowadzenia działalności gospodarczej, do uwarunkowań
szerszych (makroekonomicznych i strategicznych).
W przedstawionym badaniu zawarto por￳wnanie otoczenia ekonomicznego oraz
sektor￳w przedsiębiorstw dw￳ch kraj￳w: Estonii i Polski, kt￳re w tym samym czasie sta-
ły się członkiem Unii Europejskiej. Uog￳lniając, Estonia, dzięki większej determinacji
we wprowadzaniu liberalnych reform rynkowych, po okresie gospodarki nakazowo-roz-
dzielczej, oferowała w badanym okresie korzystniejsze warunki tzw. ładu korporacyjne-
go i prowadzenia działalności gospodarczej. Co interesujące, to jednak stabilizacja roz-
woju makroekonomicznego Polski zaważyła o lepszych niż w Estonii wskaźnikach „prze-
żywalności” przedsiębiorstw. Dane na temat kryzysu ekonomicznego lat 2007–2009 zda-
ją potwierdzać tę tendencję – przy pogłębiającej się dywergencji w rozwoju ekonomicz-
nym obu państw.
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